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Introduction 
Roper (2011a, p. 39) sums up his account of neoliberalism in New Zealand with 
the following conclusion: “In the absence of a major upsurge in working class 
and social movement struggle, the neoliberal policy regime is likely to remain 
firmly in place.” The bulk of his article lends weight to this conclusion in the 
course of offering a detailed analysis of National’s neoliberalism and New 
Zealand’s social inequality. In his final assessment Roper turns to list mid-range 
factors that underpin his conclusion. In particular, he refers to structural 
constraints resulting from the neoliberalisation of New Zealand’s financial 
regime; neoliberalisation of the outlooks of successive New Zealand 
Governments since 1984; and the balance of class forces in favour of capital 
(pp.37-8). This response focuses, first, on building a sympathetic analysis of 
these mid-range factors which are linked here with the form and dynamic of the 
‘neoliberal model of development’ (Neilson, 2011). In his conclusion Roper 
also states that if there is an upsurge in social movement and working class 
politics ‘then the question of alternatives to neoliberalism will come to the 
forefront of New Zealand politics’ (Roper, 2011a, p. 39). The second theme of 
this essay is linked to an exploratory discussion of why this might or might not 
happen and how more specifically a ‘counter-hegemonic project’ could be more 
consciously constructed and actively pursued.  
The neoliberal model of development 
In New Zealand conversations, neoliberalism is often cast as the ascendant 
policy direction of the eighties and early nineties, but a direction the Labour 
Party in particular has since abandoned. This view, based on a kind of 
‘methodological nationalism’ where nation states are understood endogenously 
and the trans-national framework their product, obscures the reverse national 
limiting effects of the prevailing trans-national framework. In this case, the 
policy direction pursued in the 1980’s integrally connected, and thus 
permanently reordered and constrained, nation state priorities and capacities to 
the on-going global neoliberal project. Rather than just an incremental and 
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relatively self-contained struggle at the national level, national politics is 
structurally limited by this global neoliberal terrain. 
Like the preceding Fordist project, the neoliberal project is practically 
driven by its ‘model of development’: defined here as a trans-national blueprint 
of economic regulation integrally connected with a national template (Neilson, 
2011). The viability of the national template is predicated on the trans-national 
regulatory framework, and vice versa. Under the Fordist model of development, 
blueprinted at Bretton Woods in 1944, the nation state’s relative autonomy to 
pursue progressive social policies was underpinned by the Fordist model of 
development’s framework of international capital mobility constraints linked 
with the trans-national Keynesian template of self-contained national 
accumulation. 
The current neoliberal model of development, that envisions a world 
where capital moves within and across national borders without impediment, 
crystallized as the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the mid 1980s. This global 
vision, summed up by Gill (1992) as a ‘new constitutionalism for disciplinary 
neoliberalism’, directly reverses the previous Fordist order by maximizing 
countries’ exposure to global market forces and capital mobility. The most 
significant reversing effect is the transformation of a world economy into a 
global political economy. The relatively self-contained nation state 
accumulation regimes supplemented by international trading under Fordism has 
been transformed by the political trans-nationalisation of economic regulation 
and the globalization of capitalist production within which nation states 
compete to be viable components of a global accumulation regime (Robinson, 
2004).  
The key to realizing the neoliberal global vision, pursued tirelessly by 
global regulatory agencies such as the IMF and more recently the WTO is to get 
nation-states especially via structural adjustment programmes and free trade 
agreements, to adopt the neoliberal national template. While Roper rightly puts 
financial liberalization at the centre of this national template, it also includes the 
removal of trade barriers, welfare state retrenchment, fiscal restraint, 
privatization, and labour market flexibilization. These essential features of this 
‘roll back’ national template, mostly holding firm to this day across the 
countries of the world including New Zealand, have been central to realizing the 
neoliberal global vision, and capital’s aspiration, of an unimpeded global market 
and capital mobility.  
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The neoliberal national template integrates nation states into a trans-
national political network, or what Robinson calls the ‘trans-national state’ 
(2001), within which “[t]he [nation] state becomes a transmission belt from the 
global to the domestic economy” (Cox, 1992, pp. 30-31). This trans-national 
framework is also central to capital’s enhanced power and profitability because 
it has facilitated capital’s aspiration to restore and extend scale economies that 
are increasingly expressed in the form of ‘global production networks’ 
(Henderson, 2002). For nation states to be economically viable they must 
become ‘competition states’ that like ‘hostile brothers’ contest with each other 
to attract and retain capital (Cerny, 1997, 2003; Hirsch, 1995, 1997). To be 
competitive countries must provide local conditions compatible with globally 
prevailing ‘necessary labour’, i.e., global wage and productivity norms that 
must be met in order for local and transnational capital to be viable.   
In short, to remain viable as national components of neoliberal global 
capitalism, countries must prioritize the interests of capital (Jessop, 1994.) This 
subordination to global capital is further intensified by its scarcity created by the 
imposition of global necessary labour norms, especially on the world’s rural 
population located in non-developed capitalist countries, which has resulted in a 
massive new source of cheap surplus labour (Neilson and Stubbs, 2011). 
Narrowing national competitiveness margins due to inadequate global demand, 
intrinsic to market capitalism and intensified by competitive globalization and 
recurring global economic crises, further structurally subordinate nation states 
to capital’s interests (Konings, 2010).  
Persisting divergence in the forms of the competition state (see Hall and 
Soskise, 2001; Boyer, 2005), occurs within a broader convergence towards the 
neoliberal template. Even successful social democratic countries that have 
resisted the neoliberal path still move unevenly in that direction (Ryner, 1997, 
2004). Sweden’s post WWII Third Way model prioritized capital 
competitiveness and socialist reformism. However, the much more hostile 
framework of global competition and global structural economic instability 
makes it harder to be competitive and even harder to square the ‘magic circle’ 
and make competitiveness compatible with socialist reformism (Meidner, 1993, 
1997). Rather than there being varieties of national capitalism, there are 
varieties of the neoliberal template (Soederberg et al, 2005). Significant 
divergences of social outcomes for nation states still occur because competition, 
and now its global intensification under the neoliberal model, is the fundamental 
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source of uneven development (Weeks, 2001). Nonetheless, under neoliberal 
global capitalism social inequality continues to increase in every country in the 
world, including New Zealand.  
Why do social democrats become neoliberals? 
In his conclusion, Roper points out how successive New Zealand governments 
since 1984 have come to believe that ‘neoliberal policies have broadly positive 
impacts on economic growth’ (p. 24). The predominance of this neoliberal 
competitiveness mentality is structurally corroborated by the fact that no 
government to the present ‘has removed any of the central features of the 
neoliberal policy regime.’ (p. 25). However, Roper’s statement begs further 
questions as to why successive governments, especially social democratic ones, 
have been drawn into the neoliberal world view?  
The strategic answer is that having adopted the neoliberal template, 
governments are unavoidably pulled towards capitalist rationality in order to 
retain economic viability. Prioritizing capital’s profit requirements necessarily 
pushes all countries to strategically adopt an institutional variant of the 
neoliberal competition state. Nonetheless, path-dependent histories, relative 
economic success, accumulated or natural advantage, also gives some countries 
more strategic opportunities, to temporarily manoeuvre towards, or maintain, a 
more social democratically inflected version of the neoliberal project. However, 
regardless of the ‘variety of neoliberalism’, policy makers are pushed towards 
pro-market regulation in response to neoliberal-driven global capitalist 
imperatives.  
More perplexing is why social democrats adopted the project in the first 
place, and why strategic submission can lead on to a positive embrace. Magnus 
Ryner’s (1997, 2004), account of why social democrats became susceptible to 
neoliberal market rationality in Sweden emphasizes the changing form of the 
‘episteme’. The social democratic reformist (i.e., equals parliamentary road to 
socialism) Third Way model adopted in Sweden from the fifties was driven by 
Trade Union economists such as Rehn and Meidner who were grounded in the 
radical traditions of political economy. However, the new generations of social 
democratic policy makers learnt falsification rationality from Popper and the 
bastard Keynesianism that in English speaking countries is associated with 
Samuelson’s undergraduate Economics textbooks. The cleverness of Samuelson 
is that he articulated Keynes’ view with orthodox market-driven micro-
economics. Thus, once the Keynesian formula was empirically falsified in a 
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Popperian sense by the experience of the seventies, only the micro-essence of 
the neoclassical perspective remained. By the end of the seventies, neoclassical 
economics increasingly articulated to the neoliberal critique of the Keynesian 
welfare state was rapidly ascending. Especially in the English speaking world, 
the neoliberal critique was becoming dominant not only in the academy but in 
national Treasuries and in the outlooks of the powerfully resourced and US-led 
international regulatory agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF. In sum, 
as economic instability increased and the credibility of Keynesianism declined, 
policymakers confronted a rapidly ascending neoliberal epistemological 
hegemony.  
Declining economic performance and policy legitimacy was occurring 
more rapidly in the Anglo Saxon countries than in the north-of-the-Rhine social 
democratic countries that had competitively adapted, rather than just followed, 
the Keynesian template. Policymakers in the Anglo Saxon countries, especially 
Great Britain and New Zealand, were faced with deepening fiscal crisis and 
poor economic performance over decades combined with the discursive 
ascendancy of the neoclassical/ neoliberal world view. In New Zealand, the 
only alternative to the neoliberal project briefly floated by key economists in the 
trade union movement amounted to little more than a half-hearted copy of the 
northern European social corporatist model that by this time was in decline 
(Campbell and Kirk, 1983). By the early 1990s, the neoliberals had emerged the 
clear victors in the ideological ‘war of position’. 
Further, key aspects of the neoliberal project have also become embedded 
in ‘common sense’. While the capitalist-elite-led neoliberal project pulled 
common sense along through the eighties and early nineties, now common 
sense appears to be much more in accord with the neoliberal project. While the 
politically contingent nature of the global market project is obscured, it appears 
in common sense as an objective expression of the natural and universal 
evolutionary logic of human existence. This natural order is seen to be 
characterized by intense competition, and New Zealand’s competitiveness is 
seen to be directly dependent on it providing a profitable terrain for firms. In 
turn, capital’s prosperity becomes ‘the key to prosperity’ of citizens as well 
(Kalecki, 1943). New Zealand’s path to wealth, security, and the World Cup 
becomes obvious: we must compete and win! Thus, voters accept the 
fundamental tenets of the neoliberal project and, correspondingly, reject 
incompatible elements of the previous Keynesian project. While the unstable 
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context of the present global economic crisis pushes the population of some 
countries to direct resistance, in New Zealand and other countries that still can 
avoid deep economic instability, the neoliberal common sense may not only 
persist but actually grow in response to the crisis. That is, when the competitive 
struggle intensifies, New Zealand must compete even more aggressively.  
National political debate and party programmes are acutely constrained to 
options that are compatible with these economic imperatives and this 
ideological mentality. Further, while social democratic parties do not question, 
and in the case of Britain’s New Labour, positively endorse the global 
imperatives of the neoliberal project, their perspectives and their programmes 
remain inside its parameters. In short, within the truncated political space 
defined by the neoliberal project, Labour parties have become the neoliberal 
Left. We are all neoliberals now! Of course, Richard Nixon’s Keynesian version 
of this slogan was uttered just as the Keynesian project was starting to falter. 
Building a counter-hegemonic project 
Roper’s conclusion that if there is an ‘upsurge in working class struggle and 
social movement politics’, ‘then the question of alternatives to neoliberalism 
will come to the forefront of New Zealand politics’ focuses the mind on the 
essential political debate. Most importantly, it begs a range of further questions. 
What might lead to an upsurge in active politics? Will alternatives, and of what 
sort, actually come to the fore?  Will a progressive alternative arise 
spontaneously or must it be made? And what role will social movements have 
in this process?  
Certainly, the active making of a democratic counter-hegemonic 
movement confronts immense challenges. The material and ideological means 
of production are owned and controlled by capital and its agents, the trans-
national state operates largely outside democratic process, the ‘democratic 
association’ of the nation state has become more like an ‘entrepreneurial 
association’ subordinated to capitalist imperatives (Cerny, 2003), and neoliberal 
common sense has become in Pierre Bourdieu’s words the ‘planetary vulgate’. 
Nonetheless, the structural conditions underpinning the urgent necessity and 
political possibility of a counter-hegemonic project are clearly crystallizing. The 
deepening economic crisis of global capitalism, integrally connected to 
colliding crisis trajectories of social polarization and descent towards eco-crisis, 
conflicts with the basic material, democratic, and social compromise functions 
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of the national state under capitalism (Hirsch and Kannnankulan, 2010; Neilson 
and Stubbs, 2011).  
As social instability within nation states deepens alongside neoliberal 
capitalism’s intractable crisis trajectory, diverse and unevenly expressed 
spontaneous upsurges in active politics can be expected across countries. 
However, constructively channelling spontaneous diversity to a common 
counter-hegemonic project is problematic. Such a project has the immense dual 
task of disarticulating social movements and common sense from present 
neoliberal attachments, and then re-articulating them as an alternative chain of 
meaning to a global social bloc that includes both a counter-hegemonic world 
view and model of development (Neilson, under review, a). One of the central 
problems for the development of such a counter-hegemonic bloc is that 
organized mainstream social movements, especially Labour and Green 
movements have been compromised by their articulation to the neoliberal 
project.  
First, though moving back from the neoliberal vision of spontaneous 
market forces and night watchman state, social democracy’s counter-movement 
Third way project in some ways represents a deeper embedding of the 
neoliberal project (see Tickell and Peck, 2003). While much more state active 
than the neoliberal rhetoric of the 1980s, the Third way approach has 
engineered pro-market regulation and articulated social democratic values to the 
neoliberal policy regime. For example, the key social democratic policy 
platform of the Keynesian era, full employment, has been deployed to justify 
the neoliberal project of economic competitiveness, commodification, and the 
need for competitive labour markets. Similarly, the union movement ends up 
legitimating rather than questioning the harsh global competitiveness norms of 
the neoliberal project when it seeks to demonstrate why unions are part of New 
Zealand’s competitiveness solution to employment and prosperity. Further, 
minor redistributive labour and welfare reforms that remain within neoliberal 
parameters reinforce the prevailing regime. Not only materially legitimating, 
such gestures also ideologically reassure the population that democratic politics 
still prevail, while all the time leaving unquestioned the neoliberal regime’s 
fundamental elements. Still, the struggle against extreme versions of 
neoliberalism by Left-leaning parties is an important part of the ‘war of 
position’. However, while key elements of the neoliberal national template 
remain an unquestioned political centre, or what Bobbio (1996) describes as an 
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‘included middle’, then such a rear-guard action is in danger of only 
legitimating and embedding, albeit a more progressive variant of, the neoliberal 
project.  
Second, for the Green movement, articulation with the neoliberal project 
has taken many forms. In part, this articulation has been driven by the 
neoliberals. In the style of the ‘post-Washington’ consensus, the neoliberal 
project appears to take the deepening ecological crisis seriously. In actuality, the 
agents of neoliberalism articulate environmental reform to the neoliberal project 
of market capitalism, as trading schemes or by linking the profit motive with a 
naturally occurring greening of technologies. Further, they colonize the radical 
environmental discourse adopting signifiers such as ‘ecological sustainability’ 
but emptying them of any radical signification (Vlachou, 2007). While the 
organized Green political movement is not simply neoliberal, it universally 
adopts the naïve ‘neither Left nor Right’ politics that also pragmatically accepts 
the idea of picking and mixing pro-environment discourses and mechanisms 
from both Left and Right paradigms. The Greens end up in a centre position in 
political space, defined as both Left and Right, where the neoliberal project of 
global capitalism is taken as an uncontroversial given. Neoliberal discourses of 
individualized responsibility and marketisation are articulated with the Green 
movement, while a radical ecological critique of global neoliberal capitalism, 
which is outside of a shared centre, gets marginalized. A counter-hegemonic 
project though not simply rejecting the good sense in the neoliberal world view 
needs to articulate it to a radical critique of neoliberal global capitalism.  
More significantly, the renewal and re-radicalization of the projects of 
social democracy and ‘ecological sustainability’ require the articulation of a 
radical critique to a new counter-hegemonic project. Following Gramsci, one 
can understand a hegemonic project as essentially combining a model of 
development and ‘world view’. Different hegemonic projects struggle in a ‘war 
of position’ for influence and dominance. Dominant hegemonic projects within 
the capitalist mode of production, that may concede ground to anti-capitalist 
forces, can be distinguished from counter-hegemonic projects that, though 
transitionally involve compromises and concessions to capital, seek to 
fundamentally transform capitalist relations. A counter-hegemonic project seeks 
a mid-range transformative path that operates between the scenario of a 
spontaneous revolutionary rupture and capitalism-reinforcing social democratic 
reform. A counter-hegemonic project seeks to deliberately construct another 
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world on the basis of a clear alternative design or model of development and 
political/ ideological strategy.  
Under the neoliberal model, nation states are subordinated to the 
imperatives of a highly unstable and crisis-ridden globalized form of the 
capitalist mode of production. Countries experience this process as increasing 
economic insecurity, inequality and social polarization, reducing economic self 
sufficiency, a growing relative surplus population, and ecological depletion and 
destabilization. While this experience varies according to national 
competitiveness, it is expressed generally as economic, political, and social 
instability and insecurity across all countries. In order to address these effects, a 
counter-hegemonic model of development need to reverse the neoliberal 
ordering of the transnational national nexus by subordinating capital to the 
needs and priorities of nation states (Neilson, under review, b). Fundamental to 
achieving such a reversal is the facilitation of a viable alternative to global scale 
production. This alternative, resonating with the ‘flexible specialization’ 
production paradigm, needs to promote economies of local propinquity and 
efficient variety for local consumption. Such an economic base has the capacity 
to undermine nation states’ global capital dependence by promoting efficient 
variety as a local self-sufficiency. It also opens up a space to develop 
sustainable, localized and democratically regulated ‘multi activity’ societies 
(Gorz, 1999). The practical viability of such a local template depends, in turn, 
on rolling back the present neoliberal form of trans-national regulation, and 
rolling out an alternative global regulatory framework. Certainly this framework 
is premised on the genuine cosmopolitanisation of  existing global institutions 
of governance (see Held, 2009; Roper, 2011b), but more, it also implies the 
reprioritizing of the goals of such global institutions towards localized self-
sufficiency and the construction of institutions that can oversee an open and 
socialized form of the globalized immaterial economy.  
Conclusion 
This response to Brian Roper’s article built on the clear and well-signposted 
groundwork he laid down for thinking about the nature and continuity of the 
neoliberal project. However, there is urgency to embrace a more strategic 
analysis that although being acutely aware of circumstantially-given limits and 
possibilities, directs thinking towards agency and the ‘making of history’. It is 
this sense of contingency that needs to light the path for rethinking of the social 
democratic project and ultimately socialism (Neilson, under review, b). More 
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specifically, counter-hegemonic discourses need to envision an alternative 
hegemonic blueprint centrally including an alternative model of development. 
For potentially counter-hegemonic mainstream movements such as organized 
Labour, progressive Third Way counter-reforms need to be articulated with a 
more critical awareness of the nature and consequences of neoliberal global 
capitalism that in turn is articulated with an alternative project and model of 
development.  
While the NZ Labour Party fails to articulate its increasingly progressive 
local programme with a more explicit and defiant critique of neoliberal global 
capitalism, and along with others does not call for all ‘Left’ parties to come 
together as an international forum to develop a practical alternative, then it will 
remain fundamentally attached to the global neoliberal project that is now 
catastrophically failing. A new reformist project is crucial for averting the 
present neoliberal global trajectory towards ‘catastrophic collapse’ (see Roper, 
2011b). However, and also in accord with Roper (2011b), though crucial such a 
project would be only a temporary fix. At best, such a counter-hegemonic 
project could become a transitional movement towards the creation of an 
‘egalitarian, democratic and environmentally sustainable socialist world beyond 
capitalism’ (p. 270). 
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